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TAKING A STAND?:  AN INITIAL ASSESSMENT 
OF THE SOCIAL AND RACIAL EFFECTS OF 
RECENT INNOVATIONS IN SELF-DEFENSE LAWS 
Mario L. Barnes* 
[I]t‘s time to question laws that senselessly expand the concept of self-
defense and sow dangerous conflict in our neighborhoods.  These laws try 
to fix something that was never broken.  There has always been a legal 
defense for using deadly force if—and the ―if‖ is important—no safe 
retreat is available.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps, not surprisingly, the controversy over the rise of self-defense 
reforms in the United States that have come to be known as ―Stand Your 
Ground‖ (SYG) laws,2 began with a story about colors.  This Article 
 
*  Professor of Law, Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development and Co-
Director, Center on Law, Equality, and Race, University of California, Irvine School of Law.  
This project benefited from presentations at the University of Hawaii William S. Richardson 
School of Law, Saint Thomas University School of Law (Fla.), Tulane Law School, the U.C. 
Irvine Center for Psychology and Law, the 2014 Association of Critical Race and Whiteness 
Studies conference in Brisbane, Australia, and support received while I was a Visiting 
Scholar at Melbourne Law School (Asia Pacific Centre for Military Law) and the American 
Bar Foundation.  Many colleagues provided helpful insights on this initial phase of a larger 
project, especially Shalonda Baker, Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Devon Carbado, Donna Coker, 
Adam Feibelman, Andrea Freeman, Jonathan Glater, Kaaryn Gustafson, Linda Kreiger, 
Charles Lawrence, Tamara Lawson, Justin Levinson, Pamela Metzger, Saru Matambanadzo, 
Ira Steven Nathenson, L. Song Richardson, and Geoffrey Ward.  I am indebted to Matthew 
Fritz-Mauer for his dedicated and superb research assistance and to my former students, 
Carolyn M. Hutcherson, Paul Kaster, Joshua Paster, Nneka Uzodinma, and Zachary Weaver, 
for research and papers that helped to shape my initial thoughts on this project.  This Article 
is part of a larger symposium entitled Critical Race Theory and Empirical Methods 
Conference held at Fordham University School of Law.  For an overview of the symposium, 
see Kimani Paul-Emile, Foreword:  Critical Race Theory and Empirical Methods 
Conference, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2953 (2015). 
 
 1. Eric Holder, Att‘y Gen., Address at the NAACP Annual Convention in Orlando, Fla. 
(July 16, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-
holder-addresses-naacp-annual-convention. 
 2. Stand Your Ground (SYG) has become a popular phrase used to describe reformed 
self-defense statutes that approve persons perceiving a threat of violence to more liberally 
respond with state-sanctioned violence.  When first proposed, these laws were also referred 
to in the press as ―make my day,‖ ―shoot first,‖ and ―license to kill‖ laws. See, e.g., Lisa 
Mahapatra, Stand Your Ground:  26 U.S. States Have “Shoot First” Laws, INT‘L BUS. TIMES 
(July 18, 2013, 9:21 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/stand-your-ground-26-us-states-have-
shoot-first-laws-1351127; Mary Sanchez, Stand Your Ground Laws a Shaky Basis for 
Justice, KAN. CITY STAR (June 17, 2013, 10:22 PM), http://www.kansascity.com/opinion/ 
opn-columns-blogs/mary-sanchez/article321136/Stand-Your-Ground-laws-a-shaky-basis-
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principally applies an empirical method and critical race theory (eCRT) lens 
to explore whether these reformed statutes, which generally have authorized 
greater use of force within the context of self-defense, deter crime and 
differentially affect Whites, Blacks, and other racial groups.  In an early 
case that had the potential to severely undermine the success of such law 
reforms, however, different colors were at issue.  In 2004, Florida enacted 
what would become a blueprint for SYG laws by modifying the Florida 
criminal code to do away with the common law duty to retreat for those 
who reasonably believe it is necessary to defend themselves against an 
imminent use of unlawful force.3  The law reform, which the legislature 
argued would allow citizens to stand up for themselves in response to 
violent threat without fear of criminal or civil sanction,4 went into effect in 
2005.  In 2006, an early controversial case involved two very colorfully 
named individuals.  Damon ―Red Rock‖ Darling and Leroy ―Yellowman‖ 
Larose were involved in a Miami shoot-out that resulted in the death of 
nine-year-old Sherdavia Jenkins.5  Both men had extensive criminal 
records, and some reports suggested the shooting broke out during the 
course of an ill-fated drug deal.6  Darling claimed, however, that he feared 
that Larose was going to shoot him, so he drew his gun and began 
shooting.7  Admittedly, these were likely not the victims of violence Florida 
sought to empower when the law was changed,8 but there was a colorable 
 
for-justice.html (―Prior to the spread of these new laws, people were expected to back down, 
to retreat, if possible.  Shoot First, Stand Your Ground, Make My Day laws can make it legal 
to refuse to walk away.‖ (emphasis added)). 
 3. See FLA. STAT. § 776.012 (2014).  The common law duty required persons 
confronted with force to withdraw from the encounter if they could do so without 
endangering themselves. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 227–28 
(6th ed. 2012) (noting that a ―no retreat‖ rule is now applied in a majority of jurisdictions).  
The no-retreat rule, which previously was mostly limited to defense of home statutes, now 
applies every place a person had a lawful right to be.  Defense of home statutes, which are 
commonly referred to as Castle Doctrine statutes, not only provide that home dwellers are 
not required to retreat from threatened violence, but also may carry a presumption with 
regard to the reasonableness of one‘s fear. See FLA. STAT. § 776.013.  For a criticism of this 
overlooked aspect of Florida‘s SYG law reform, see Donna Coker, “Stand Your Ground” in 
Context:  Race, Gender and Politics, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 943, 944–45 (2014) (noting that, 
in addition to eliminating the duty to retreat in the self-defense language, the reformed 
statute included immunity from prosecution for successful SYG claimants, the presumption 
of reasonableness for those alleging defense of home, and the availability of using deadly 
force to interdict a forcible felony, whether one was in reasonable fear or not).  Remarkably, 
it appears that the reasonable fear to stand one‘s ground could even apply if an initial 
aggressor were fleeing. See Tamara Rice Lave, Shoot to Kill:  A Critical Look at Stand Your 
Ground Laws, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 827, 834 (2013) (describing the facts from Hair v. State, 
17 So. 3d 804 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)). 
 4. See S.B. 4346, 107th Leg., 37th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2005) (claiming the purpose of the 
law was to ―restore absolute rights of law-abiding people to protect themselves . . . without 
fear of prosecution or civil action‖). 
 5. David Ovalle, Girl‟s Parents Face Her Accused Killer, MIAMI HERALD, July 28, 
2006, at 1B. 
 6. David Ovalle, Sherdavia‟s Killer Gets Lesser Charge But Could Face 50 Years, 
MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 9, 2009, at 1A. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See Kris Hundley et al., Florida „Stand Your Ground‟ Law Yields Some Shocking 
Outcomes Depending on How Law Is Applied, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Feb. 17, 2013), 
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argument that one or both of them could claim they were standing their 
ground.9 
Ultimately, the outcome of the case did not turn on Darling‘s SYG claim.  
Instead, a news report at the time indicated:  ―The six-person jury never 
agreed which man was acting in self-defense, however, because members 
couldn‘t settle on who actually started the gunfight.  The jurors did agree 
that Darling was guilty of manslaughter for recklessly spraying the 
neighborhood with bullets.‖10  This rejection of Darling‘s claim was likely 
important for a number of reasons related to the viability of the then-nascent 
law reform.  First, had he been successful in his SYG claim, the statute 
would have absolved a felon involved in a gunfight, potentially as part of a 
drug deal, of criminal liability for the killing of an innocent child.  Without 
any further consequences, the optics of that outcome would have been 
extremely poor.  Under Florida law, however, Darling also would have 
been provided immunity from civil liability.11  While the claim is 
speculative in nature, it seems at least plausible to assume that the law 
being used to such an effect, early on, would have had an impact on public 
sentiment regarding these laws.12  Moreover, such a result in Florida likely 
would have slowed the spread of these statutes to other states.  Instead, 
three years after the killing, the jury held Darling criminally responsible for 
Sherdavia‘s death.  This verdict gave the Jenkins family a measure of 
 
http://www.tampabay.com/news/publicsafety/crime/florida-stand-your-ground-law-yields-
some-shocking-outcomes-depending-on/1233133 (assessing SYG case data and indicating 
that many who invoke the law have prior violent criminal histories). 
 9. See Ovalle, supra note 6.  Darling actually made a motion to assert immunity under 
SYG, but the defense was rejected by the trial judge and that decision was upheld by an 
appeals court.  See Tonyaa Weathersbee, How Stand Your Ground Is Killing Black People, 
ROANOKE TIMES (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.roanoke.com/opinion/commentary/ 
weathersbee-how-stand-your-ground-is-killing-black-people/article_d738013c-abcc-11e3-
8640-0017a43b2370.html. 
 10. See Ovalle, supra note 6.  While the defense claimed Darling was entitled to stand 
his ground, the prosecution alleged he was engaged in two potential unlawful acts that would 
exclude him from availing himself of the defense:  (1) that he was a felon in possession of a 
gun, and (2) that the gunfight may have resulted from a botched drug sale. Id.  The effect of 
status crimes, such as felons in possession of firearms, however, is now being contested in a 
SYG jurisdiction. See Marc Freeman, Stand Your Ground May Be Defense for Felon, SUN-
SENTINEL (July 17, 2014), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2014-07-17/news/fl-stand-your-
ground-felon-opinion-20140716_1_your-ground-ground-law-felon (noting that an appeals 
court in Florida‘s Fourth District reversed its earlier decision disallowing a SYG defense for 
felon in possession of a firearm and that the Florida Supreme Court has now taken up such a 
case). 
 11. See FLA. STAT. § 776.032 (2014) (―A person who uses or threatens to use force as 
permitted in § 776.012, § 776.013, or § 776.031 is justified in such conduct and is immune 
from criminal prosecution and civil action for the use or threatened use of such force by the 
person, personal representative, or heirs of the person against whom the force was used or 
threatened, unless the person against whom force was used or threatened is a law 
enforcement officer . . . .‖). 
 12. See Weathersbee, supra note 9 (commenting that Sherdavia Jenkins‘s status as an 
innocent victim should have been a catalyst for reconsidering or repealing SYG laws).  For 
theories of the connection between legislation and community values, see generally 
Elizabeth Megale, A Call for Change:  A Contextual-Configurative Analysis of Florida‟s 
“Stand Your Ground” Laws, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1051 (2014). 
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justice—albeit with a manslaughter rather than murder conviction for 
Darling—but the finding of guilty and three years that passed between the 
killing and conviction also may have given the SYG law reform the 
opportunity it needed to garner support in Florida and expand to other 
jurisdictions. 
Almost immediately after Florida modified its self-defense statute, the 
United States underwent an SYG revolution, with a considerable number of 
states enacting similar laws.  SYG reforms were not, however, achieved 
through deliberate or organic processes built upon Florida‘s successful 
experience with the reforms.  Instead, as is discussed in greater detail 
below, SYG initiatives were quickly taken up in many states largely 
because of to the political efforts of the American Legislative Exchange 
Council (ALEC) and the National Rifle Association (NRA).13  Jurisdictions 
adopted varying elements of Florida‘s statute.  Acknowledged by former 
Attorney General Holder in the quote that begins this Article, the simplest 
variant of the law reform did away with the common law duty to retreat for 
those threatened with violent force.  This adoption alone can be more or 
less dangerous depending on whether the jurisdictions use objective, 
subjective, or hybrid forms of a reasonableness inquiry to assess a given 
threat.14  The more robust variants of the reforms, however, imported 
Florida‘s innovation of connecting self-defense claims to justifications 
related to defending one‘s home.  Historically, many common law 
jurisdictions have blessed a broader use of force when defending one‘s 
home, known as defense of habitation or the ―Castle Doctrine.‖15  Under 
 
 13. See “Stand Your Ground” Laws:  Civil Rights and Public Safety Implications of the 
Expanded Use of Deadly Force:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil 
Rights, and Human Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 8 (2013) 
(statement of Professor Ronald S. Sullivan Jr., Harvard Law School) [hereinafter Sullivan 
Testimony], available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/10-29-
13SullivanTestimony.pdf (―Since 2005, over half the states have now passed laws based in 
whole or in part on Florida‘s law and ALEC‘s model legislation.‖); Megale, supra note 12, 
at 1079–84; P. Luevonda Ross, The Transmogrification of Self-Defense by National Rifle 
Association-Inspired Statutes:  From the Doctrine of Retreat to the Right to Stand Your 
Ground, 35 S.U. L. REV. 1 (2007); Zachary L. Weaver, Florida‟s “Stand Your Ground” 
Law:  The Actual Effects and the Need for Clarification, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 395, 396–97 
(2008) (identifying the NRA‘s role in pushing the law change in Florida and beyond); John 
Nichols, How ALEC Took Florida‟s „License to Kill‟ Law National, NATION (Mar. 21, 2012, 
10:57 PM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/166978/how-alec-took-floridas-license-kill-law-
national (identifying ALEC‘s role in spreading SYG laws). 
 14. Many jurisdictions claim to use an objective standard of reasonableness.  The Model 
Penal Code (MPC), by contrast, proposes a subjective standard. See MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 3.04 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (―[U]se of force upon or toward another person is 
justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose 
of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force . . . .‖ (emphasis added)).  Some 
jurisdictions, such as New York, have crafted a hybrid standard that mixes subjective and 
objective beliefs. See People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986) (clarifying that, although 
New York had incorporated the Model Penal Code‘s subjective self-defense language into its 
statute, the standard still requires jurors to objectively assess whether a person with the 
experiences of the defendant would feel as the defendant claims to have felt). 
 15. The Castle Doctrine incorporates the notion that one‘s home is one‘s castle—a place 
where one should feel safest—and threats to one‘s home are thought to be extremely 
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this doctrine, when responding to violence threatened within the home,16 
typically by uninvited non-occupants,17 one did not have to argue self-
defense.  Instead, in most circumstances, a homeowner enjoys no duty to 
retreat and a rebuttable presumption that they have used force 
appropriately.18  Florida‘s defense of home statute, section 776.013 of 
Florida Statutes, explicitly includes a presumption of reasonableness for 
violence committed within dwellings and certain occupied vehicles.19  
While the self-defense statute,  section 776.012, does not expressly include 
a presumption of reasonableness, law enforcement practices effectively 
achieve a similar result by preventing authorities from charging a person 
with an ostensibly valid SYG claim, as long as the person was in a place 
they had a lawful right to be and did not engage in unlawful activity.20 
The SYG amendments also affected the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion in criminal cases where putative defendants claimed they were 
standing their ground.  In many of these cases, prosecutors have struggled 
to determine whether charges should be brought.21  As such, another 
innovation jurisdictions could borrow from Florida is to effectively 
transform self-defense in many cases where an SYG defense is alleged, 
 
dangerous to not just property but one‘s family.  Versions of the Castle Doctrine exist in 
most U.S. jurisdictions. See DRESSLER, supra note 3, at 228–29. 
 16. Under the Castle Doctrine, jurisdictions typically address not only uses of violence 
against those within the home, but those attempting to enter the home as well. See, e.g., State 
v. Boyett, 185 P.3d 355, 361 (N.M. 2008) (holding that defense of habitation instructions 
were available to a defendant who shot a victim on his front doorstep). But see People v. 
Brown, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 513, 519 (1992) (determining that a resident has no ―reasonable 
expectation of protection from unauthorized intrusion onto the kind of front porch involved 
in the case‖ and, as such, the porch did not constitute entry under CAL. PENAL CODE § 198.5 
(the Home Protection Bill of Rights)).  Other jurisdictions have expanded the doctrine to 
include other discrete localities, such as workplaces and motor vehicles. See, e.g., LA. REV. 
STAT. § 14:20(4)(a) (2014) (establishing Castle Doctrine defense when ―inside a dwelling, a 
place of business, or a motor vehicle‖); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51.2(b) (2014) (―The lawful 
occupant of a home, motor vehicle, or workplace is presumed to have held a reasonable fear 
of imminent death or serious bodily harm . . . .‖). 
 17. Even jurisdictions that have expanded the application of their Castle Doctrine 
statutes exempt the rebuttable presumption of justified violence from applying to residents 
and other lawful occupants of a dwelling. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51.2(c)(1); TEX. 
PENAL CODE § 9.31 (2014) (justifying use of force against a person ―who unlawfully and 
with force entered, or was attempting to enter unlawfully and with force, the actor‘s 
occupied habitation, vehicle, or place of business or employment‖). 
 18. See, e.g., Brown, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 515–16 (noting that the California defense of 
home statute ―creates a rebuttable presumption that a residential occupant has a reasonable 
fear of death or great bodily injury when he or she uses deadly force against an unlawful and 
forcible intruder into the residence‖). 
 19. FLA. STAT. § 776.013 (2014); see also supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 20. See supra note 3.  Individuals in SYG states, then, may feel as entitled to respond to 
perceived threats of violence on the streets as they would threats within their homes.  In 
effect, SYG laws create a right for people to move through public spaces feeling as if they 
are surrounded by ―portable castles.‖  This phrase and apt characterization of SYG were 
suggested to me by Professor Ira Nathenson. 
 21. See Tamara F. Lawson, A Fresh Cut in an Old Wound—A Critical Analysis of the 
Trayvon Martin Killing:  The Public Outcry, the Prosecutors‟ Discretion, and the Stand 
Your Ground Law, 23 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 271, 284–90 (2012); see also Weaver, 
supra note 13, at 406–09. 
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from an affirmative defense argued during a trial, into a potential bar to 
criminal prosecution.22  Soon after Florida undertook its law reform, a 
number of legal scholars began to produce critiques of SYG.  The greatest 
number of these articles substantially focused on the expanded embrace of 
citizen violence and the questionable wisdom of providing criminal and 
civil immunity to such behavior.23  While the majority of this scholarship 
provides informative commentaries, as described below, this project has a 
different focus.  Relying both upon recent empirical studies and insights 
from CRT, this Article seeks to empirically and critically investigate the 
deterrence value24 and potential racialized effects of SYG statutes. 
A number of the jurisdictions adopting Florida-like changes to their self-
defense statutes mimicked Florida‘s rationale of removing restraints from 
potential victims of violence.25  Few, if any, commented on whether the law 
changes would deter violent crime—a concern that even if it were not the 
stated goal of a statute, one would imagine would inform criminal law 
reforms.26  Additionally, no evidence suggests that most adopting states 
 
 22. See Jennifer Randolph, How to Get Away with Murder:  Criminal and Civil 
Immunity Provision in “Stand Your Ground” Legislation, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 599, 616–
25 (2014).  In Florida, where a decision is made to prosecute someone despite facts that may 
support an SYG claim, the defendant is still entitled to raise SYG as an affirmative defense, 
but doing so triggers a pretrial hearing on the issue. See Coker, supra note 3, at 944 (noting 
that the availability of the defense is assessed using the ―preponderance of evidence 
standard‖); Lawson, supra note 21, at 285–97. 
 23. See Coker, supra note 3; Lave, supra note 3; Lawson, supra note 21; Randolph, 
supra note 22; Weaver, supra note 13; see also Mary Anne Franks, Real Men Advance, Real 
Women Retreat:  Stand Your Ground, Battered Women‟s Syndrome, and Violence As Male 
Privilege, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1099, 1116 (2014) (refuting the gender violence claim). 
 24. Deterrence is typically identified as connected to the punishment side of the crime—
especially the death penalty—and punishment formulation. See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 
3, at 11–16; Robert Tanner, Studies Say Death Penalty Deters Crime, WASH. POST (June 11, 
2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/11/AR2007061 
100406.html.  Given, however, that SYG laws may affect violent crime rates by sanctioning 
violence in a larger number of contexts, deterrence seems like a particularly relevant 
consideration for actions covered by SYG statutes as well. 
 25. See Megale, supra note 12, at 1081–83; Nichols, supra note 13; Matt Gertz, ALEC 
Has Pushed the NRA‟s “Stand Your Ground” Law Across the Nation, MEDIA MATTERS AM. 
(Mar. 21, 2012), http://mediamatters.org/blog/2012/03/21/alec-has-pushed-the-nras-stand-
your-ground-law/186459; Adam Weinstein, How the NRA and Its Allies Helped Spread a 
Radical Gun Law Nationwide, MOTHER JONES (June 7, 2012), http://www.motherjones.com/ 
politics/2012/06/nra-alec-stand-your-ground. 
 26. While at least one commentator indicated that jurisdictions also claimed deterrence 
as a justification, see Sullivan Testimony, supra note 13, at 9 (―Proponents of Stand Your 
Ground laws often point to public safety and a reduction of crime as evidence of the efficacy 
of these laws.‖), the justification does not appear in media claims discussing the law.  One 
would have expected such a discussion to be prevalent given that the laws were heavily 
backed by the NRA and were initially opposed by prosecutors and law enforcement. See 
Weaver, supra note 13, at 401–03; Abby Goodnough, Florida Expands Right to Use Deadly 
Force in Self Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2005, at A18 (pointing to NRA backing of the 
laws and quoting the Miami police chief as follows:  ―Whether it‘s trick-or-treaters or kids 
playing in the yard of someone who doesn‘t want them there or some drunk guy stumbling 
into the wrong house, . . . you‘re encouraging people to possibly use deadly physical force 
where it shouldn‘t be used.‖); Zachary L. Weaver, Killing Shows Flaws of NRA-Backed Law, 
CNN (Mar. 23, 2012, 5:34 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/22/opinion/weaver-florida-
law/. 
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queried whether enacting SYG reforms could lead to other problematic 
social and legal consequences,27 such as troubling racialized differences in 
the application of the statutes.  A wealth of empirical and scholarly legal 
evaluations of criminal justice processes has noted such racial differences.28  
One of the claims asserted here, which is informed by a commitment to 
eCRT principles, is that it is highly advisable for jurisdictions to consider 
potential racialized consequences prior to making dramatic changes in areas 
of law where data reflecting significant racial disparities already have been 
noted. 
This Article lays out a preliminary sketch for a more expansive project 
that will assess many aspects of the operation of SYG laws.29  Given the 
symposium format and the need to compile more research for the larger 
project, the arguments advanced here have more modest goals.  Primarily, 
this Article seeks to use the SYG revolution to argue that eCRT‘s goal of 
calling for the enhanced and nuanced study of race within the disciplines30 
can have a real-world impact on law reform.  To my mind, there are at least 
two basic ways for a legal scholar to ―do‖ eCRT work.  First, critical 
scholars can leverage empirical work to bolster their theoretical, doctrinal, 
normative, and critical claims about how race matters within legal processes 
and encounters.31  Second, legal scholars, working alone, or with those who 
are typically better trained in social science methodologies, can design and 
 
 27. Ohio is an exception.  One Ohio legislator unsuccessfully challenged the SYG 
reform by citing to evidence of racialized effects. See Jeremy Pelzer, Ohio House Passes 
Gun Bill with “Stand Your Ground” Provision After Lengthy Debate, CLEVELAND.COM 
(Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2013/11/ohio_house_passes_ 
gun_bill_wit.html. 
 28. See infra notes 44, 89–91, 101–07107 and accompanying text. 
 29. In that larger project, I hope both to design and carry out empirical research and 
include a comparative element to assess the evolution of self-defense in other countries with 
criminal justice systems emanating from common law traditions. 
 30. This has been a focal point of the scholarship of the creators and participants within 
the eCRT movement. See, e.g., Laura E. Gómez, A Tale of Two Genres:  On the Real and 
Ideal Links Between Law and Society and Critical Race Theory, in THE BLACKWELL 
COMPENDIUM TO LAW AND SOCIETY (Austin Sarat ed., 2004); Laura E. Gómez, Looking for 
Race in All the Wrong Places, 46 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 221, 225 (2012) [hereinafter Gómez, 
Looking for Race] (encouraging social legal scholars to do ―much more to incorporate race 
and racism into the core of what we think and write about as law and society scholars‖); 
Osagie K. Obasogie, Foreword:  Critical Race Theory and Empirical Methods, 3 U.C. 
IRVINE L. REV. 183, 186 (2013) (providing an overview of the genesis of the eCRT project 
and stating that a goal of the endeavor was to ―identify the challenges and opportunities 
associated with rethinking race scholarship in a manner that reflected the theoretical 
orientation put forward by critical race scholarship and also embraced the methodological 
contributions of social science research‖); Osagie K. Obasogie, Race in Law and Society:  A 
Critique, in RACE, LAW AND SOCIETY (Ian Haney López ed., 2006). 
 31. This form of ―doing‖ eCRT, while potentially advantageous, can also be quite 
fraught.  As two prominent CRT scholars have stated in a recent article on discussing the 
possibilities for collaborations between crits and social scientists, ―[s]ocial science research 
has much to offer critical race theorists, including empirical data and theoretical frameworks 
that support core CRT ideas.  At the same time, we acknowledge that such a collaboration 
can potentially undermine CRT‘s core intellectual commitments.‖ Devon W. Carbado & 
Daria Roithmayr, Critical Race Theory Meets Social Science, 10 ANN. REV. LAW. SOC. SCI. 
149, 150 (2014). 
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execute research studies in law.32  While my work has often relied upon the 
former approach,33 in the larger project of which this Article is a part, I take 
initial steps to formulate a design for the research I believe is necessary to 
fully explicate how SYG laws operate. 
This Article, however, principally focuses on three elements of the rise of 
SYG laws.  First, Part I explores justifications for SYG laws by presenting 
the results of recent empirical studies of the reforms.  In particular, Part I 
presents studies both to assess criminal deterrence justifications for SYG 
laws and to also query the potential racialized effects produced from the law 
reforms.  Part I then identifies problems with the current studies, whose 
findings, while empirical, still involve interpretation and are not immune 
from the blind spots and biases that shape considerations of race in other 
contexts.  This Part ultimately outlines why future research in the area 
should supplement the studies‘ predominant use of quantitative data with a 
tool that has been foundational within CRT—narrative methodology.  
Exploring SYG case narratives, which may reveal decision making 
influenced by negative race stereotypes,34 will help crystalize the myriad 
dangers surrounding states‘ expansion of violent forms of self-help.  While 
the story of the killing of Sherdavia Jenkins did not become the early 
catalyst necessary to undo SYG, the story surrounding George 
Zimmerman‘s killing of Trayvon Martin—a case like Darling‘s where the 
 
 32. There is, of course, a corollary of this principle for those in the research disciplines, 
providing that they should consult CRT theories and scholarship to inform how their 
research projects are designed, carried out, and assessed. See Gómez, Looking for Race, 
supra note 30, at 234–41.  A nice example of such is studies that have recently looked at 
intersectionality, a concept that critical race theory cofounder Kimberlé Crenshaw 
introduced into legal scholarship as a way to discuss law‘s inability to address how multiple 
identity traits produce overlapping and reinforcing forms of subordination. See Rachel Kahn 
Best et al., Multiple Disadvantages:  An Empirical Test of Intersectionality Theory in EEO 
Litigation, 45 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 991 (2011) (using empirical methods to assess the 
phenomenon within the employment context); Ange-Marie Hancock, Empirical 
Intersectionality:  A Tale of Two Approaches, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 259, 260 (2013) 
(asserting that the article‘s purpose was to ―examine[] two contrasting empirical 
operationalizations of intersectionality theory and suggest[] a series of trade-offs between 
them, including preservation of theoretical integrity and current litigational utility‖). 
 33. See, e.g., Mario L. Barnes & Robert S. Chang, Analyzing Stops, Citations, and 
Searches in Washington and Beyond, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 673 (2012) (assessing data 
collected over five years by a team of researchers from Washington State University that 
examined Washington State Patrol traffic stops, citations, and searches); Mario L. Barnes, 
Black Women‟s Stories and the Criminal Law:  Restating the Power of Narrative, 39 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 941 (2006) [hereinafter Barnes, Black Women‟s Stories] (exploring how 
socio-legal theories of legal consciousness and narrative are compatible methodologies to 
explore the treatment of social identity in criminal cases); Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario 
L. Barnes, By Any Other Name?:  On Being “Regarded As” Black, and Why Title VII Should 
Apply Even If Lakisha and Jamal Are White, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1283 (using Bertrand and 
Mullainathan‘s résumé research to argue for changes to the reading of Title VII to capture 
discrimination based on proxies for race); Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, The 
Obama Effect:  Understanding Emerging Meanings of “Obama” in Anti-Discrimination 
Law, 87 IND. L.J. 325 (2012) (using experimental social psychology studies of empowerment 
to discriminate against Blacks being linked to moral claims related to Whites endorsing 
President Obama). 
 34. See infra notes 92–97 and accompanying text. 
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arguments about the defense pervaded the case, but where SYG was not 
ultimately a supposed deciding factor35—did cause critical attention to be 
visited upon such statutes.  If nothing else, the outcome in the Zimmerman 
case proves the power of narratives surrounding even single cases to 
significantly galvanize public sentiment.36 
Part II analyzes how we might reformulate public opinion around the 
advisability of SYG laws.  First, Part II suggests that a central takeaway of 
the SYG revolution should be that, no matter what new research data reveal, 
further law reform or repeal is likely not possible without mechanisms for 
political advocacy.  Second, Part II attempts to explicate concerns about 
SYG laws by analyzing how perceptions of dangerousness are 
operationalized under the statutes across race.  Through a thought 
experiment, this part queries whether support for SYG laws would be as 
significant if more citizens were in danger of becoming victims of SYG 
violence caused by incorrect perceptions of who is dangerous.  Part II 
concludes with some thoughts on how the larger project will proceed.  At 
bottom, a goal of both this Article and the larger project is to force all but 
the irredeemable to see SYG reforms as representing another vein in which 
we must pose the ostensibly simple question that has too long produced an 
unsatisfying answer in this country:  What is the value of a black life?37 
I.   ON THE NECESSITY (OR NOT) OF STAND YOUR GROUND 
According to a preliminary report for an in-progress American Bar 
Association (ABA) National Task Force Report, as of August 2014, thirty-
 
 35. While SYG may have been the reason George Zimmerman was not initially charged 
for killing Trayvon Martin, he did not raise the defense affirmatively in either a pretrial 
hearing or during his trial.  Still others have remarked that SYG was implicated because of 
the jury instructions, which stated Zimmerman had no duty to retreat. See John Rosenthal, 
Stand Your Ground Laws or License to Kill Without a Cause?, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 6, 
2013, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-rosenthal/stand-your-ground-
laws_b_3714874.html. 
 36. The social movement that seeks to confront state-sanctioned violence against black 
men, which has adopted the motto, ―Black Lives Matter,‖ was created in response to the 
killing of Trayvon Martin.  See Jessica Guynn, Three Women, Three Words, A New 
Movement, USA TODAY, Mar. 5, 2015, at 3B (crediting Alicia Garza with creating the 
movement through the initiation of the hashtag #BlackLivesMatter); BLACK LIVES MATTER, 
http://blacklivesmatter.com/about (last visited Apr. 23, 2015). 
 37. Recent events involving police killings of black boys and young men certainly 
bolster this claim.  Michael Brown was killed after an altercation with Officer Darren Wilson 
in Ferguson, Missouri. See Sandhya Somashekhar & Kimbriell Kelly, Was Michael Brown 
Surrendering or Advancing to Attack Officer Darren Wilson?, WASH. POST (Nov. 29, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2014/11/29/b99ef7a8-75d3-11e4-a755-
e32227229e7b_story.html.  Police in Staten Island, New York, killed Eric Garner by 
administering a chokehold, even as he repeatedly stated that he could not breathe. See J. 
David Goodman & Al Baker, New York Officer Facing No Charges in Chokehold Case, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2014, at A1.  Twelve-year-old Tamir Rice was killed by a Cleveland 
police officer as he brandished a toy gun. See Ryllie Danylko, Cleveland Police Officer 
Fatally Shoots 12-Year-Old Tamir Rice:  The Big Story, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER (Nov. 
25, 2014), http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2014/11/cleveland_police_ 
officer_fatal.html. 
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three states had some version of an SYG law in place.38  Florida‘s law, 
however, only might have had a regional impact if not for the efforts of the 
ALEC and the NRA.  After the passing of Florida‘s law, which was led by 
lawmakers with ties to ALEC,39 the two organizations worked together to 
create model legislation to facilitate the law being adopted more broadly.40  
They provided text that was almost identical to the Florida statute, 
including borrowing Florida‘s rationale for the law:  ―no person or victim of 
crime should be required to surrender his or her personal safety to a 
criminal nor should a person or victim of crime be required to needlessly 
retreat in the face of intrusion or attack.‖41  At least two key inquiries, 
discussed below, were absent from the processes that produced these laws. 
First, despite what one might expect prior to changes to criminal statutes, 
very few adopting states justified the law reforms based on benefits for 
deterring crime—a principal justification for criminal punishment.  Like 
Florida, many adopters premised their law reform on protecting citizens‘ 
decisions to violently respond to perceived threats outside of their homes.  
As will be explored in the larger project, this goal arguably seems more 
connected to privileging personal autonomy, providing certain citizens 
dominion over larger swaths of public space42 and encouraging certain 
types of masculine gender performance.43  Instead of mimicking Florida‘s 
anti-cowardice motive, responsible states should have at least considered 
 
 38. See ABA, NATIONAL TASK FORCE ON STAND YOUR GROUND LAWS, PRELIMINARY 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 19 (2014) [hereinafter ABA SYG TASK FORCE REPORT]. 
 39. See Lave, supra note 3, at 836–39; Nichols, supra note 13 (discussing the role of 
Florida state Representative Dennis Baxley and state Senator Durell Peadon in passing the 
SYG legislation and noting that ―Baxley and Peadon worked closely with NRA lobbyist 
Marion Hammer to pass the Florida law . . . .  Baxley and Peadon served in the Florida 
House and Senate as active members of the American Legislative Exchange Council 
(ALEC), the shadowy Koch brothers-funded network that brings together right-wing 
legislators with corporate interests and pressure groups to craft so-called ‗model 
legislation‘‖). 
 40. See Nichols, supra note 13. 
 41. See Gertz, supra note 25. 
 42. In essence, the anti-cowardice justification for SYG may represent an effort to mark 
who, by law, should be endowed with authority, rights, and privileges in and over certain 
spaces.  As a comparative example, Australian scholar Ghassan Hage identifies as similar 
phenomenon where Whites in Australia understand themselves as ―masters of national 
space‖ and ―enactors‖ of law, but where ―ethnics‖ (immigrants) are considered ―objects to be 
governed.‖ GHASSAN HAGE, WHITE NATION 16–17 (2000).  Socio-legal scholar Kitty 
Calavita has previously applied this work to analyzing the interrelation of white, minority, 
and immigrant identities within the United States. See KITTY CALAVITA, INVITATION TO LAW 
AND SOCIETY:  AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF REAL LAW 70–72 (2010); Kitty Calavita, 
Immigration Law, Race, and Identity, 3 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 1 (2007).  I thank Professor 
Geoff Ward for bringing this work to my attention. 
 43. The law reform then serves to legally sanction violence that results from hyper-
masculinized gender performance. See, e.g., Frank Rudy Cooper, “Who‟s the Man?”:  
Masculinities Studies, Terry Stops, and Police Training, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 671 
(2009); Angela P. Harris, Gender Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 
777, 790–92 (2000).   Another scholar has referred to this phenomenon as ―institutionalized 
hegemonic violence.‖ Jamie R. Abrams, The Collateral Consequences of Masculinizing 
Violence, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 703 (2010).  I thank Tulane Law professors Pam 
Metzger and Saru Matambanadzo for raising this point. 
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relevant data with regard to rates of violent crime within their jurisdictions 
and how SYG reforms could be expected to lower those rates.  Second, 
there was no robust discussion of trends and issues with self-defense 
statutes more generally that could be exacerbated by SYG reforms.  As it 
does within nearly every component of the criminal justice system, race 
matters for self-defense statutes.  At least since the pathbreaking Baldus 
study44—which the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately dismissed as proof of 
correlation rather than causation45—we have understood that races of the 
perpetrators and victims matter to juries when assessing punishment for 
death-eligible defendants.  While SYG laws are not punishment reforms, 
they do involve legal determinations about when uses of force are justified.  
Moreover, post-Baldus, there has been excellent scholarship examining the 
operation of race within the context of self-defense laws, especially studies 
explicating how race bias informs subjective perceptions about which 
people are dangerous and when it is reasonable to respond with force.46  
Given that SYG blesses a greater use of force where one perceives a threat, 
one would have imagined that these relevant literatures on race and self-
defense would also have been consulted prior to law reform.  In fact, some 
states are now considering such evidence as a part of their legislative 
processes.  For example, in Oregon, Connecticut, and Iowa, prior to 
enacting legislative changes to criminal laws, lawmakers must review racial 
impact statements.47  Minnesota lawmakers observe a similar practice, 
although it is not required by state law.48 
Although crime control data and potential racialized effects were not 
considered prior to the SYG revolution, some initial data of this kind are 
presented below to (1) suggest potential justifications for reforming SYG 
statutes, and (2) identify the type of studies that can be used in the future to 
enhance legislative decision making prior to significant law changes of this 
kind. 
A.   Examining the Empirical Data Thus Far 
As a starting point for assessing the advisability and effectiveness of 
SYG statutes, a group of recent empirical studies of the law reforms are 
next considered.  First, these studies are analyzed for their findings on 
whether SYG laws deter violence.  While the outcomes are disparate, these 
studies are particularly important for the larger project moving forward 
because they present a range of methods being applied to varied data 
sources pertaining to violent crime rates. Second, these studies are reviewed 
 
 44. See DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY:  A LEGAL 
AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1990). 
 45. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312–13 (1987). 
 46. See infra notes 91–96 and accompanying text. 
 47. See Maggie Clark, Should More States Require Racial Impact Statements for New 
Laws?, STATELINE (July 30, 2013), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/blogs/stateline/2013/07/30/should-more-states-require-racial-impact-statements-for-
new-laws. 
 48. Id. 
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for conclusions about whether SYG laws produce problematic racialized 
effects.  These findings, which principally consider how victim selection 
affects whether one is determined to be justified in using violence, however, 
are considered within a larger body of empirical and critical work 
evaluating connections between identity and claims of self-defense.  The 
goal of this broader conversation is to facilitate an understanding of how 
members of certain racial groups are much more likely to be perceived as 
violent, and as such, more likely to become victims of state-sanctioned 
violence under SYG. 
1.   The Conflicted Data on Crime Deterrence 
At this point, very few studies have located a deterrent effect of SYG 
laws, but the laws have not been summarily debunked as ineffective.  While 
deterring crime was not the initial stated goal of most of the SYG reforms, 
criminal deterrence is a useful way to measure the effectiveness of such 
laws.  We are early in the genesis of such studies, which may help to 
explain why the data are currently conflicted.  John Lott, author of More 
Guns, Less Crime,49 is an advocate for SYG Laws.  While his manuscript 
has been significantly criticized for its methods by some within the research 
community,50 his research has touted the positive effects on crime control 
of conceal and carry laws.51  In recent editions of the text and public 
testimony, however, he has also addressed the benefits of SYG laws.  He 
has been highly critical of the recent work by researchers who found that 
SYG laws have no or negative effects on crime control and has claimed that 
the racialized effects of the reformed statutes benefit Blacks.52 
Currently, only a study by Yue Yu has found a similar positive effect on 
crime deterrence.  Yu‘s research also does not involve the contested 
methods or data used by Lott.  Her results, however, are recent, conflict 
with the results of other studies described below, and have yet to be vetted 
by other researchers.  Using ―synthetic matching‖ and ―difference in 
difference (DID) identification strategy,‖  she evaluated crime rates in 
 
 49. JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME:  UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUN 
CONTROL LAWS (2d ed. 2000). 
 50. For example, Yale Law Professor Ian Ayres and Stanford Economics and Law 
Professor John Donohue III have significantly criticized the text. See Ian Ayres & John J. 
Donohue III, Shooting Down the “More Guns, Less Crime” Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 
1193 (2003); see also John Donohue III et al., Substance Vs. Sideshows in the More Guns, 
Less Crime Debate:  A Comment on Moody, Lott, and Marvell, 10 ECON. J. WATCH 32 
(2013). 
 51. See, e.g., LOTT, supra note 49, at 51–54; John R. Lott Jr. &  David B. Mustard, 
Crime, Deterrence, and Right-to-Carry Concealed Handguns, 26 J. LEGAL STUDIES 1, 64 
(1997). 
 52. See “Stand Your Ground” Laws:  Civil Rights and Public Safety Implications of the 
Expanded Use of Deadly Force:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil 
Rights, and Human Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 3–7 (2013) 
(statement of John Lott, President, Crime Prevention Research Ctr.), available at 
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/10-29-13LottTestimony.pdf. 
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certain selected U.S. counties between 1995 and 2010.53  She claimed to 
find the following: 
The results showed that the SYG Law had a positive significant effect on 
the decrease in the violent crime rate; indicating that the SYG Law caused 
a decrease in the violent crime rate of around 3.5%.  The result was 
derived after controlling for relevant variables such as youth percentage, 
sex ratio, race structure, unemployment rate, and the county and year 
fixed effects.54 
Yu, however, was measured in assigning meaning to this data, claiming 
the following confirming work must be done. 
First, research is needed to identify the characteristics of counties that are 
more likely to be affected by the SYG law.  Second, replication of the 
current study using other software packages to perform synthetic 
matching is important.  Third, future analysis should use all of the 
counties to generate more reliable results.55 
Other than Lott and Yu, researchers have either located an ambiguous or 
negative effect of SYG laws on criminal deterrence.  Yu used the work of 
Texas A&M economists Cheng Cheng and Mark Hoekstra as a starting 
point for her study, but characterized their results as ambiguous.56  Cheng 
and Hoekstra‘s report of their data comparing within-jurisdiction variations 
in self-defense laws found that SYG laws do not appear to deter crimes 
such as burglary, robbery, or aggravated assault, and by contrast, they result 
in a statistically significant 8 percent net increase in the number of reported 
murders and non-negligent manslaughters.57  In an unpublished work, 
independent researcher Howard Ross Nemerov claims of the Cheng and 
Hoekstra research that ―there are a number of errors, assumptions, and 
miscalculations in their research that justify revisiting the question of 
whether or not Castle Doctrine laws have any impact on crime.‖58  Other 
researchers, however, generally have supported Cheng and Hoekstra‘s 
claims.  For example, using monthly reports of U.S. vital statistics of 
firearm-related homicide victimization and applying the ―difference in 
difference‖ approach, Georgia State researchers Chandler McClellan and 
Erdal Tekin also found that SYG laws were associated with increased 
 
 53. Yue Yu, Deterrence Effect of Stand Your Ground Law on Crime in Eastern US 
States, 42 ATLANTIC ECON. J. 119 (2014). 
 54. Id. at 120. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 119. 
 57. Cheng Cheng & Mark Hoekstra, Does Strengthening Self-Defense Law Deter Crime 
or Escalate Violence?  Evidence from Expansions to Castle Doctrine, 48 J. HUM. RESOURCES 
821–53 (2013) (using FBI Uniform Crime Reporting data for fifty states from 2000 to 2010, 
and applying varied methods, to include difference in difference (DID) for SYG and non-
SYG jurisdictions, introducing distributions of placebo effects, and adding control changes 
for factors such as economic conditions, welfare spending, and policing intensity). 
 58. See Howard Ross Nemerov, Do Castle Doctrine Laws Impact Violent Crime? 1 
(Dec. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2189392. 
3192 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
homicides.59  In an unpublished study of SYG in Florida, using Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention vital statistics data and a method referred to 
as synthetic control—which allows the researchers to mimic what the 
change to crime rates would have been in the absence of the SYG law 
changes—researchers Abdul Munasib and Mouhcine Guettabi found that 
the law reform led to an increase in gun deaths but did not have a 
significant impact on violent crimes.60  While there have not been enough 
studies that have conducted multiple assessments using similar data and 
methods as those claiming that SYG is counterproductive to reducing 
crime, the narrative that has emerged in media reports of these studies is 
that SYG laws increase homicides.61 
2.   Empirical Proof of the Costs of Blackness Within Self-Defense Law 
a.   Racialized Effects of Stand Your Ground Laws? 
While the crime control research provides critical data for assessing the 
advisability of SYG reforms, another issue with these laws relates to their 
potentially racially disparate application.  Along with coauthors, I have 
previously written that in our now ostensibly ―post-race‖ world, it is 
difficult to convince people that disparate racial outcomes arise out the 
operation of commonplace (rather than aberrant) animus or societal 
structures.62  Still, in keeping with the goals of eCRT, it is important to note 
that studies have determined that when we ignore the ways that race 
 
 59. Chandler McClellan & Erdal Tekin, Stand Your Ground Laws, Homicides, and 
Injuries 2 (Nat‘l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18187, 2012), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w18187.pdf (data were from 2000 to 2009, and the study 
controlled for characteristics such as state racial composition, age distribution, urban 
population, unemployment, and poverty). 
 60. Abdul Munasib & Mouhcine Guettabi, Florida Stand Your Ground Law and Crime:  
Did It Make Floridians More Trigger Happy? 1 (Aug. 23, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2315295 (considering data from 2000 to 2010).  At 
least one researcher has claimed that this synthetic control method may be superior to 
regression methodology for assessing the effects of SYG laws. See Anton Strezhney, Some 
More Evidence That Florida‟s „Stand Your Ground‟ Law Increased Firearm Homicide 
Rates, CAUSAL LOOP (July 16, 2013), http://causalloop.blogspot.com/2013/07/some-more-
evidence-that-floridas-stand.html (describing his own study, which used synthetic control 
methodology to determine that between 2006 and 2010 Florida experienced 1 to 1.5 more 
homicides per 100,000 due to the SYG law change, and stating that ―[w]hile parametric 
regression is an ubiquitous and powerful tool for causal inference, it is a very model-
dependent approach.  This can sometimes lead to misleading conclusions when the model 
gets too far away from the data‖). 
 61. See, e.g., Marc Fisher & Dan Eggen, „Stand Your Ground‟ Laws Coincide with Jump 
in Justifiable-Homicide Cases, WASH. POST (Apr. 7, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/stand-your-ground-laws-coincide-with-jump-in-
justifiable-homicide-cases/2012/04/07/gIQAS2v51S_story.html.  This is also a central 
finding of the ABA Stand Your Ground Task Force. See ABA SYG TASK FORCE REPORT, 
supra note 38, at 10–11. 
 62. See Mario L. Barnes, Erwin Chemerinsky & Trina Jones, A Post-Race Equal 
Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 967 (2010).  Others have made similar claims regarding post-racial 
claims masking racially motivated actions and outcomes. See IAN HANEY LOPEZ, DOG 
WHISTLE POLITICS (2013). 
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explicitly matters within processes, bias wins out.63  I suggest that evidence 
of how race shapes the experience of individuals within society and the 
justice system, more generally, should caution lawmakers from enacting 
underanalyzed reforms within the criminal law.  In this section, I present a 
snapshot of the types of evidence to which I refer.  First, however, I will 
present the current data regarding how race appears to matter within SYG 
jurisdictions. 
Perhaps the study that has done the most to test the early racialized 
effects of SYG was conducted by John Roman, a senior policy fellow at the 
Urban Institute.  In recent research using FBI  Supplementary Homicide 
Report (SHR) data from 2005 to 2010, he found that homicides with a 
white perpetrator and a black victim are nearly ten times more likely to be 
ruled justified compared to cases with a black perpetrator and a white 
victim.64  This gap grows in SYG jurisdictions.65  Moreover, cases with a 
white perpetrator and a black victim are 281 percent more likely to be ruled 
justified than cases with a white perpetrator and white victim.66  There were 
two other interesting points pertaining to the race of the perpetrator/victim 
in Roman‘s research for SYG jurisdictions:  black on white homicides were 
barely half as likely as white on white homicides to be ruled justified, and 
black on black homicides statistically have the same chance of being ruled 
justified as white on white homicides.67  As part of a PBS report on SYG 
laws, Roman also compared 43,500 justified homicides between SYG and 
non-SYG states and found similar racial disparities.68 
Other racial data has been more conflicted.  In the McClellan and Tekin 
research referenced above, the researchers found that SYG laws lead to 
increased homicides among white males but not black males.69  Oddly, 
however, in a part of their research that looked at emergency room visits 
rather than deaths, they found a very different racialized effect.  In SYG 
jurisdictions, for white men there was a nearly 20 percent increase in the 
frequency of gun-related injuries that resulted in emergency room visits.70  
 
 63. See, e.g., Michael I. Norton et al., Color Blindness and Interracial Interaction:  
Playing the Political Correctness Game, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 949 (2006) (discussing studies 
revealing that efforts by Whites to be perceived as colorblind have a negative impact on 
black-white interactive exercises); Victoria Plaut, 3 Myths Plus a Few Best Practices for 
Achieving Diversity, SCI. AM. (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/3-
myths-plus-a-few-best-practices-for-achieving-diversity (presenting studies in which 
colorblind approaches increased racial tensions rather than reducing implicit bias). 
 64. JOHN K. ROMAN, URBAN INST., RACE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE, AND STAND YOUR 
GROUND LAWS:  ANALYSIS OF FBI SUPPLEMENTARY HOMICIDE REPORT DATA 7 tbl.2 (2013), 
available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412873-stand-your-ground.pdf. 
 65. See id. at 6–7 & tbl.2. 
 66. Id. at 9. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See Sarah Childress, Is There Racial Bias in “Stand Your Ground” Laws?, PBS 
FRONTLINE (July 31, 2012, 12:40 PM), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/criminal-
justice/is-there-racial-bias-in-stand-your-ground-laws.  In the PBS data, in non-SYG states, 
Whites who kill Blacks are 250 percent more likely to be found justified than Whites who 
kill Whites; in SYG states that number jumps to 354 percent. See id. 
 69. McClellan & Tekin, supra note 59, at 7. 
 70. Id. at 30. 
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For black women, however, the increase was roughly 60 percent.71  The 
authors had no real explanation for this anomaly.72 
As Florida is ground zero for SYG reform, a robust empirical assessment 
of SYG laws, to include race effects, would be very important data.  
Unfortunately, the best data with regard to race and SYG in Florida are 
quite insightful, but they are neither scholarly in nature nor strongly 
empirical.  Still, the data, which were compiled in investigative reports by 
two sets of Tampa Bay Times writers, are helpful to review based upon the 
comprehensive picture they paint.73  Looking at all identifiable SYG cases 
in Florida at the times their reports were completed, the authors describe 
two phenomena.  In the first report, the authors found that a large number of 
people who successfully invoked SYG had histories of violence, with more 
than 60 percent of them having been arrested at least once prior to the time 
they killed someone and invoked SYG.74  The second report indicated that 
success with invoking SYG was connected to the race of the victim.  With 
regard to the cases reviewed, the authors wrote:  
A Tampa Bay Times analysis of nearly 200 cases—the first to examine 
the role of race in ―stand your ground‖—found that people who killed a 
black person walked free 73 percent of the time, while those who killed a 
white person went free 59 percent of the time.75 
With regard to perpetrators, however, Blacks fared slightly better than 
Whites under SYG:  ―Overall, black defendants went free 66 percent of the 
time in fatal cases compared to 61 percent for white defendants—a 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 30 n.40 (acknowledging that this substantial increase in injuries among black 
women is consistent with the hypothesis that SYG laws lead to more violence, especially for 
this group, but is inconsistent with the authors‘ analysis of SYG‘s effects on homicides). 
 73. Kameel Stanley & Connie Humburg, Many Killers Who Go Free with Florida 
„Stand Your Ground‟ Law Have History of Violence, TAMPA BAY TIMES (July 21, 2012, 4:30 
AM), http://www.tampabay.com/news/courts/criminal/many-killers-who-go-free-with-
florida-stand-your-ground-law-have-history/1241378.  More recently, there has been an 
empirically focused preliminary report that builds upon the Tampa Bay Times research in 
Florida.  Looking at 307 SYG cases, the report seeks to tabulate ―various aspects, variables, 
and factors associated with Florida‘s Stand Your Ground law and its enforcement,‖ but fails 
to consider the impact of race. See Albert E. McCormick Jr., The Enforcement of Florida‟s 
“Stand Your Ground” Law:  Preliminary Findings, 6 J. PUB. & PROF. SOC. 1, 22–24 (2014).  
The report cautions that the findings must be tempered because of the secondary nature of 
the media sources used to identify SYG cases. See id. at 2. 
 74. Stanley & Humburg, supra note 73. 
 75. Susan Taylor Martin, Kris Hundley & Connie Humburg, Race Plays Complex Role 
in Florida „Stand Your Ground‟ Law, TAMPA BAY TIMES  (June 2, 2012, 1:00 PM), 
http://www.tampabay.com/news/courts/criminal/race-plays-complex-role-in-floridas-stand-
your-ground-law/1233152.  The report appropriately indicated that the number of cases 
reviewed could not support causation claims and also included interesting insights such as 
charges were often not filed in mixed race cases, and that while black victims were more 
often carrying weapons when killed, there were also ―many cases where people went free 
after killing a black victim under questionable circumstances.‖  Id. 
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difference explained, in part, by the fact blacks were more likely to kill 
another black.‖76 
The findings of the Tampa Bay Times reports are troublesome for a 
number of reasons.  First, they suggest that the population primarily seeking 
to benefit from SYG is not the innocent victims legislatures were ostensibly 
attempting to empower.  Second, both the Tampa Bay Times reports and 
John Roman‘s research continue to demonstrate how black and white lives 
are differentially valued in this country.77  Finally, Tampa Bay Times data 
portend an anomaly that few researchers have cogently articulated:  because 
most violence is historically intra- rather than interracial,78 if one controls 
for other discriminatory practices within the criminal justice system, SYG 
should tend to favor black killers over time.79  This is so for the unfortunate 
reason that victims of black offenders more often will be black.  To be more 
specific, and perhaps as Trayvon Martin demonstrated, young black men 
are likely to be the most vulnerable and least vindicated of victims.80  While 
one could argue about the systemic benefits to Blacks of this unfortunate 
happenstance, to do so would seem to at least implicitly accept the 
diminished value assigned to black lives. 
 
 76. Id.  The Tampa Bay Times report also tracked cases for Hispanic victims, but 
indicated such victims only made up seven percent of the cases and acknowledged that 
police may have misidentified some Hispanic victims as black or white.  Id. 
 77. See supra notes 64–68.  This difference in valuing black and white lives has been 
demonstrated in other studies.  In addition to the Baldus study—which analyzed death 
penalty sentences—a similar phenomenon was seen in a study of vehicular homicide cases. 
See Edward Glaesser & Bruce Sacerdote, The Determinants of Punishment:  Deterrence, 
Incapacitation and Vengeance (Harvard Inst. of Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No. 1894, 
Apr. 2000), available at http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/glaeser/files/the_ 
determinants_of_punishment_deterrence_incapacitation_and_vengeance.pdf.  In a study of 
drivers who accidentally killed others, drivers who killed women received sentences that 
were 56 percent longer, while drivers who killed Blacks received sentences that were 53 
percent shorter. Id. at 1. 
 78. See ALEXIA COOPER & ERICA SMITH, U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1980–2008, at 11–12 (2011), 
available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/htus8008.pdf.  The data indicated that 
between the years of 1980–2008, Blacks were disproportionately represented among victims 
and offenders and 93 percent of black victims were killed by black offenders. Id.; see also 
Patrik Johnson, Racial Bias and „Stand Your Ground‟ Laws:  What the Data Show, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 6, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/ 
2013/0806/Racial-bias-and-stand-your-ground-laws-what-the-data-show (―While blacks 
represent 12 percent of the US population, they make up 55 percent of its homicide victims, 
the vast majority of those perpetrated by other blacks.‖). 
 79. See supra notes 76–77.  I thank Georgetown Law Professor Paul Butler for pushing 
me to address this aspect of the SYG data.  Others have similarly claimed that SYG statutes 
are good for women who will be sanctioned to use greater force when fighting off sexual 
violence. See Coker, supra note 3, at 949 (stating but not advocating this point); cf. Franks, 
supra note 23, at 1116.  
 80. See Vickie M. Mays et al., Using the Science of Psychology to Target Perpetrators 
of Racism and Race-Based Discrimination for Intervention Efforts:  Preventing Another 
Trayvon Martin Tragedy, 5 J. SOC. ACTION COUNS. PSYCHOL. 11, 19 (2013).  Additionally, 
irrespective of socioeconomic class, studies have shown that black and Latino boys are 
exposed to more violence. See Julie L. Crouch et al., Income, Race/Ethnicity, and Exposure 
to Violence in Youth:  Results from the National Survey of Adolescents, 28 J. COMM. 
PSYCHOL. 625, 632 (2000). 
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While these early studies are starting to fill in needed data on the 
operation of race in SYG jurisdictions, currently the results are 
inconclusive.  Depending on which study or report one reads, with regard to 
SYG, race either matters not at all,81 in counter-normative ways,82 or 
precisely in the way one might imagine given the disproportionately 
negative consequences that typically attach to race in the criminal justice 
system.83  Reconciling this uneven landscape of how race matters within 
SYG jurisdictions, or who has ―standing‖ to stand their ground, will be a 
part of my larger project.  As I have attempted to demonstrate here, the 
research needed to explicate the role of race in SYG jurisdictions must pay 
close attention to the effects of both the myriad sources of data on violent 
crimes and the plural methodologies selected to assess them.  The goal is 
not to ―cherry pick‖ the research most helpful to a CRT focus.84  Rather, 
scholars engaged in eCRT work need to fully understand both the 
interrelation of the studies and what they portend, as a group, if they wish to 
appropriately contextualize their critical legal analysis.  While this 
undertaking is vital, I recently have been reminded that whatever the 
research ultimately reveals regarding the connection between SYG laws and 
race, it is certainly the case that undoing the SYG law reform would not 
necessarily remove racially disparate results from claims of self-defense.85 
b.   Studying the Meaning of Race to Self-Defense More Broadly 
This data described above are crucial for a number of reasons.  First, 
beyond the facts that intra-racial murder rates are higher, African 
 
 81. See Yu, supra note 53 (using a control group in her study that considered the effects 
of racial categories but reporting no findings in the study). 
 82. See supra notes 53, 78 (describing claims based on the Florida data that SYG 
benefits Blacks), 71–74 (finding that SYG laws created significant negative effects for the 
homicide rate for white men and gun-related injury rates for white men and black women). 
 83. See supra notes 64–66, 73 (detailing the how SYG laws create significant negative 
outcomes for black victims).  One of the goals of the larger project is to expand the 
consideration of the effects of race in SYG research so that it more meaningfully includes 
the study of a greater number of groups and is not so heavily focused on comparisons 
between Blacks and Whites.  For a critique that race studies too often become fixated on a 
black/white binary paradigm, see Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: 
The “Normal Science” of American Racial Thought, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1213 (1997).  
 84. See Carbado & Roithmayr, supra note 31, at 162. 
 85. As the U.S. Supreme Court in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), opined, one 
of the issues of trying to correct racially disparate results in the criminal justice system is that 
they permeate every juncture of the system. Id. at 312.  I thank Duke University Sociology 
Professor Eduardo Bonilla-Silva for pressing me to address this point.  Professor Aya Gruber 
has recently emphasized that irrespective of the SYG law reforms that racial disparity in the 
criminal justice system exists largely because of the operation of discretion. See Aya Gruber, 
Race to Incarcerate:  Punitive Impulse and the Bid to Repeal Stand Your Ground, 68 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 961, 965 (2014) (―It is thus possible that repealing stand your ground will 
increase Florida murder convictions generally, but leave untouched, or possibly even 
exacerbate, racial disparities.‖ (citation omitted)).  For powerful and formative work on the 
connection between discretion and racially disparate outcomes within the criminal justice 
system, see ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE:  THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN 
PROSECUTOR (2007). 
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Americans are disproportionately more often victims of violent crime.86  
Second, poor communities where people of color disproportionately reside 
are plagued with greater rates of violence.87  Third, men and women of 
color are more likely to be perceived as dangerous and threatening, even 
when engaging in ambiguous or nonviolent conduct.88  Critical race 
scholars would insist that this lived experience should be accounted for 
when jurisdictions consider measures that authorize state-sanctioned 
violence in a greater number of contexts.  As a shaping influence, eCRT 
advocates and studies need to supply work that translates these experiences 
into actionable data. 
Thus, social psychology studies that focus more broadly on the 
experience of minorities within the criminal justice system form an 
essential element to fully explicating how SYG laws work.  As mentioned 
above, the Baldus study was an early example of how the races of the 
perpetrator and victims can lead to differential punishment, even under 
circumstances where no intentional racism or bias are identified.89  Recent 
MacArthur ―Genius Grant‖ recipient and Stanford law and psychology 
professor Jennifer Eberhardt has done consistently excellent work seeking 
to answer such questions.90  One recent report by Professor Eberhardt and 
her colleagues has sought to explain the relevance of the social 
psychological studies that contain germane lessons for interracial SYG 
ground encounters.  Specifically, the report articulates how the implicit 
forms of racial bias we see in other portions of the criminal justice system 
are operationalized within the SYG context.91  For example, numerous 
 
 86. See supra note 78.  I consider this data point to be an example of what University of 
Southern California Law Professor Jody Armour has described as the black tax—―the price 
Black people pay in their encounters with Whites (and some Blacks) because of Black 
stereotypes.‖ JODY DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM:  THE HIDDEN 
COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA 13 (1997). 
 87. This phenomenon appears to be true globally as well as domestically. See Kira 
Zalan, How Violence Perpetuates Poverty:  The Struggle to Get Out of Poverty Is 
Relentlessly Undermined by Violence, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Mar. 14, 2014, 6:00 PM), 
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2014/03/14/how-violence-perpetuates-poverty. 
 88. For example, in a now widely known study using University of California Irvine 
undergraduates, white observers perceived slight and ―ambiguous‖ shoves as more violent 
when performed by Blacks. See Birt L. Duncan, Differential Social Perception and 
Attribution of Intergroup Violence:  Testing the Lower Limits of Stereotyping of Blacks, 34 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 590, 595–96 (1976). 
 89. See David C. Baldus, Charles Pulaski & George Woodworth, Comparative Review 
of Death Sentences:  An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 661 (1983). 
 90. See, e.g., R. Rick Banks, Jennifer Eberhardt & Lee Ross, Discrimination and 
Implicit Bias in a Racially Unequal Society, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1169 (2006); Jennifer 
Eberhardt, Imaging Race, 60 AM. PSYCHOL. 181 (2005) (reviewing neuroimaging studies 
related to race); Jennifer Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy:  Perceived Stereotypicality 
of Black Defendants Predicts Death Penalty Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 383 (2006) 
[hereinafter Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy]; Jennifer Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black:  
Race, Crime and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876 (2004) 
[hereinafter Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black]. 
 91. See ABA SYG TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 38, at 30. 
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studies finding that Blacks are thought to be more criminal,92 threatening,93 
and violent,94 explain why Blacks would be more likely to be victims under 
statutes where a perception of threat supplies the justification for using 
force.95  Of course, the perception of threat is also germane for standard 
self-defense claims.  SYG becomes more dangerous because it authorizes 
greater uses of force in a larger set of contexts.  A helpful overview of many 
studies that look at the role of race in assessing threat is supplied in the 
ABA Task Force report.96 
Empirical assessments are not the only ones that are germane to 
explicating the meaning of race within self-defense doctrines.  A number of 
legal scholars have sought to identify the myriad and sophisticated ways 
that race shapes outcomes within the context of criminal law.  For example, 
at the same time Baldus was examining racial differences in death penalty 
rates, University of Hawaii Law Professor Charles Lawrence, relying on 
insights from social science wrote the germinal CRT article, The Id, the 
Ego, and Equal Protection:  Reckoning with Unconscious Racism.97  There, 
 
 92. For excellent overviews of the longstanding hyper-criminalization of Blacks in the 
United States, which has roots in post-emancipation practices and continues through today‘s 
drug enforcement policies, see MICHELE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW:  MASS 
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); WILLIAM STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE 
OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011); MICHAEL TONRY, PUNISHING RACE:  CONTINUING 
AMERICAN DILEMMA 6–9 (2012).  These broad claims are backed by results from more 
discrete empirical studies of race and crime. See, e.g., Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black, supra 
note 90, at 888 (finding that, when asked, ―Who looks criminal?,‖ police officers identified 
Blacks more often than Whites); id. at 879–80 (finding that subjects were able to discern 
degraded visuals of weapons more quickly when they were associated with a black face); 
Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Targets of Discrimination:  Effects of Race on Responses to 
Weapons Holders, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 399, 403 (2003) (finding that 
subjects were response-biased, providing weapon-appropriate responses more readily to 
Blacks than Whites); Barbara Watson et al., Drug Use and African Americans:  Myth Versus 
Reality, 40 J. ALCOHOL & DRUG EDUC. 19 (1995) (finding that respondents, including police 
officers, identified Blacks over 95 percent of the time when they were asked who is the 
typical illicit drug user). 
 93. See Joshua Correl et al., The Police Officer‟s Dilemma:  Using Ethnicity to 
Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
1314, 1320 (2002) (examining policy and community-member race-based responses to 
potentially threatening people and finding a ―shooter‘s bias‖ where putative black 
perpetrators are shot more quickly and frequently). 
 94. See Duncan, supra note 88.  Interestingly, the study results finding that Blacks are 
perceived as more violent were reproduced with sixth grade subjects. See Andrew Sagar & 
Janet Schofield, Racial and Behavioral Cues in Black and White Children‟s Perceptions of 
Ambiguously Aggressive Acts, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 590 (1980). 
 95. Stereotypes associating Blacks and crime are so strong that studies have found 
subjects may change previously assigned racial classifications when primed with race-
specific stereotypes. See generally Aliya Saperstein & Andrew M. Penner, Racial Fluidity 
and Inequality in the United States, 118 AM. J. SOC. 676 (2012) (finding that, when 
identified as unemployed, jailed, or receiving government assistance, racially ambiguous 
individuals are more likely to be identified as black, even if they were not previously 
identified as black). 
 96. ABA SYG TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 38. 
 97. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:  Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) [hereinafter Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, 
and Equal Protection].  More recently, Professor Lawrence has commented on his original 
article and the body of unconscious bias research that has arisen in its wake. See Charles R. 
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he provided a devastating critique of legal standards requiring that 
remediable racial bias could only be proven through intent or purpose.98  
McCleskey v. Kemp,99 the Supreme Court opinion which dismissed 
Baldus‘s work as only reflecting a correlation,100 was such a case in the 
criminal law area.  Since Professor Lawrence wrote his article, there have 
been many scholarly articles that have more generally considered how 
processes such as implicit bias factor into policing and other criminal 
justice processes.101  Jody Armour‘s work on self-defense and reasonable 
racism was a strong early entrant in this area.102  More recently, UC Irvine 
Law professor Song Richardson‘s work, alone, and with social scientists, 
has made a meaningful contribution.  For example, her work on arrest 
efficiency or ―hit rates‖ for police stops, which borrows from theories of 
implicit social cognition, is an example of work challenging unconscious 
bias in policing.103  Additionally, her work with UCLA social psychologist 
Phillip Goff has been instrumental in articulating how unconscious 
processes can lead to mistaken beliefs about criminality, a concept they 
define as the ―suspicion heuristic.‖104  With regard to the operation of this 
heuristic, the authors identify how the heuristic disadvantages Blacks, who 
―serve as our mental prototype (i.e. stereotype) for the violent street 
criminal.‖105 
Within the self-defense context, Richardson and Goff‘s work builds on 
existing scholarship on normative understandings of reasonableness that has 
been extremely influential.  George Washington Law professor Cynthia 
Lee‘s work has both identified the existence of racial bias in reasonableness 
assessments in self-defense, and queried how courts should account for 
it.106  Most recently she has specifically explored these issues within the 
 
Lawrence III, Unconscious Racism Revisited:  Reflections on the Impact and Origins of the 
Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, 40 CONN. L. REV. 931 (2008). 
 98. See Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, supra note 97, at 318.  An 
important case relying on this articulation of the necessity of intent, is Washington v. Davis, 
426 U.S. 229 (1976), which denied the availability of constitutional redress for state-based 
racial disadvantage without proof of discriminatory intent on the part of state actors, despite 
the presence of disparate racial impact. Id. at 239–41. 
 99. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
 100. Id. at 292–97. 
 101. See, e.g., Charles Ogletree et al., Coloring Punishment:  Implicit Social Cognition 
and Criminal Justice, in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW 45 (Justin D. Levinson & 
Robert Smith eds., 2012). 
 102. See ARMOUR, supra note 86, at 19–27.  For a recent claim that Professor Armour‘s 
theory captures the racial dynamics of SYG encounters, see D. Marvin Jones, “He‟s a Black 
Male . . . Something Is Wrong with Him!”  The Role of Race in the Stand Your Ground 
Debate,” 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1025, 1029–30 (2014). 
 103. See L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. 
REV. 2035 (2011); L. Song Richardson, Police Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 87 
IND. L.J. 1143 (2011). 
 104. L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Self-Defense and the Suspicion Heuristic, 
98 IOWA L. REV. 293 (2013). 
 105. Id. at 310. 
 106. See, e.g., CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN:  PASSION AND FEAR IN 
THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM (2003); Cynthia Lee, Race and Self-Defense:  Toward a 
Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367 (1996).  To the extent this 
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context of the George Zimmerman case.107  From an eCRT perspective this 
work is important because it is critical race work—like this Article—that 
heavily leans on insights from social science research.  It is also important 
in other ways that make it different from the largely quantitative studies of 
SYG above.  First, critical work that is empirically focused, still often seeks 
to proscriptively encourage change at the site of study or comment—
something that may or may not be a goal of empirical work.  In other 
words, where some empirical work just seeks to expose ―what is,‖ critical 
race work is often as focused on calling for a specific intervention as it is 
interested in demystification.  Another way of capturing this difference is to 
suggest that empirical work focuses heavily upon locating statistical 
significance whereas critical work is far more concerned with the impact or 
societal effects of such measurements.  Second, critical work seeks to 
represent missing stories and identify the ways that law may be complicit in 
ordering unfair arrangements that disenfranchise certain groups.  The next 
section suggests how these two CRT goals require additional methods to be 
considered in order for the social science research to more fully capture 
how race matters in SYG jurisdictions. 
B.   Missing Data:  The Call for Stories 
While the data above provide a quantitative overview of outcomes under 
SYG laws, they do not provide a complete picture of how these laws are 
experienced, especially across race.  There are missing stories and this is 
important because narratives shape our world.108  The introduction of 
narratives has also served as an important methodological tool for CRT 
scholars.109  As UCLA Law Dean and Professor Rachel Moran has stated: 
Another crossroad for critical race theory is determining whether it shares 
a unifying methodology.  Methodological coherence could be especially 
important if the field‘s substantive focus grows increasingly far-flung.  At 
present, critical race theorists deploy a variety of techniques, ranging from 
relatively traditional analyses of law and policy to interdisciplinary and 
historical treatments.  Even so, the most striking approach is narrative, a 
method pioneered by feminist legal theorists and embraced by many 
prominent race scholars.110 
 
work has heavily relied upon interrogating commonplace but biased understandings, it has 
been pushed forward by recent work with a greater focus on rooting out antiracist sentiments 
in normative reasonableness assessments. See, e.g., Jonathan Markovitz, “Spectacle of 
Slavery Unwilling to Die”:  Curbing Reliance Upon Racial Stereotyping in Self-Defense 
Cases, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. (forthcoming 2015). 
 107. See Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient:  Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a Not 
Yet Post-Racial Society, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1555 (2013).  She has also looked at reasonableness 
and unconscious bias within the context of manslaughter laws and queried how courts should 
respond to gay panic defenses. See LEE, supra note 106, at 203–75; Cynthia Lee, The Gay 
Panic Defense, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471 (2008). 
 108. See ARMOUR, supra note 86. 
 109. See Barnes, Black Women‟s Stories, supra note 33, at 951–58. 
 110. Rachel F. Moran, The Elusive Nature of Discrimination, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2365, 
2378–79 (2003). 
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First-person narratives capturing precisely how those inhabiting minority 
identities fare within the criminal justice system would ideally be used.111  
Such narratives are important because numbers alone rarely capture the full 
breadth of lived experience of any study‘s subjects.  For marginalized 
populations, who may be at once mischaracterized and ignored within 
research studies and the formal localities where law is created and 
contested,112 narrative becomes a tool to preserve and present a different 
world view.113  While narrative as a method has been severely criticized 
within legal scholarship,114 the relevance and utility of stories also has been 
a bit of sticking point between critical scholars and socio-legal scholars.115  
Critical scholars, however, have traditionally advocated personal stories as 
a means to elucidate the types of identity-based disadvantage that may be 
overlooked when one considers the meaning of statistically significant, but 
not shockingly large, racial disparities.116  These stories also have been 
acknowledged by socio-legal researchers as a means for assessing the legal 
 
 111. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Bloods and the Crits, NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 9. 1996), 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/the-bloods-and-the-crits (indicating that, in its 
weakest form, the call for the use of narrative is ―nothing more than a proposal for 
broadening the narratives available to judges and juries, to help them get (quite literally) to 
the bottom of things‖). 
 112. For two outstanding examples of how judicial or formal responses to one‘s personal 
story—which is often the very source of information upon which legal proceedings 
expound—can be shaped by a speaker‘s race and gender identity, see Patricia Ewick & 
Susan S. Silbey, Conformity, Contestation and Resistance:  An Account of Legal 
Consciousness, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 731 (1992) (describing the story of how black female 
research subject, Millie Simpson, was ignored within her criminal legal proceedings); Lucie 
White, Subordination, Rhetorical Skills and Sunday Shoes:  Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. 
G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990) (describing the author‘s attempts to change a black female 
welfare recipient‘s story about how she spent overpaid funds in order to give her a better 
chance of prevailing in an administrative proceeding). 
 113. See Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others, A Plea for 
Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1987); Leslie Espinoza & Angela Harris, Afterword:  
Embracing the Tar Baby, LATCRIT Theory and the Sticky Mess of Race, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 
1585 (1997). 
 114. See Barnes, Black Women‟s Stories, supra note 33 (describing the history of attacks 
upon the use of stories in critical race and feminist legal scholarship); Carbado & Roithmayr, 
supra note 31, at 161–62 (pointing out that the centrality of narrative to CRT has been 
contested and discussing the claims of Judge Richard Posner and Professors Daniel Farber 
and Suzanna Sherry, prominent critics of storytelling within legal scholarship). 
 115. For some insight into efforts to import the critical meaning of stories into socio-legal 
discourse, see Mario L. Barnes, Racial Paradox in a Law and Society Odyssey, 44 LAW & 
SOC‘Y REV. 469 (2010) (responding to the personal stories of the author‘s encounters with 
race throughout his life in Professor Richard Lempert‘s Law and Society Association 
presidential address); Charles Lawrence III, Listening for Stories in All the Right Places:  
Narrative and the Racial Formation Theory, 46 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 247 (2012) (responding 
to the lack of personal stories in Professor Laura Gómez‘s Law and Society presidential 
address). 
 116. For example, data detailing differential rates of invoking SYG may not be nearly as 
impactful as three post-Zimmerman trial examples of African Americans unsuccessful in 
their SYG claims, with facts to which many would be sympathetic. See Annie-Rose Strasser, 
With Racial Roles Reversed, Three Self-Defense Cases That Went the Other Way, 
THINKPROGRESS (July 15, 2013, 9:50 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/politics/2013/07/15/ 
2297541/self-defense-zimmerman. 
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attitudes and legal consciousness of the marginalized.117  Second, 
prominent scholars have asserted that when social scientists do not 
intentionally or explicitly focus their inquiries on race, their methods—
which typically eschew multicultural approaches—are less trustworthy.118  
For these reasons, one goal of my larger project is to design a qualitative 
component for SYG studies.  Such an endeavor would not only be 
completely consistent with the goals of CRT, it comports with an exciting 
trend in recent socio-legal research, which includes qualitative, often 
narrative, components alongside quantitative data.  For example, in studies 
focusing on punishing welfare recipients,119 explicating anti-integration 
violence,120 interrogating police stops,121 and understanding how litigants 
experience employment discrimination litigation,122 we have seen 
interviews leveraged in remarkably effective ways. 
Thus far, none of the SYG studies have included a robust qualitative 
component, which could be achieved by including interviews with alleged 
perpetrators, victims and their families, politicians, lawyers, judges, and 
other legal actors.  In some jurisdictions, the best we could do to locate this 
type of information would be to search media accounts for ostensible SYG 
cases.123  These accounts, in turn, may outline issues within the cases that 
may be otherwise missed because the laws include bars to criminal 
prosecution and civil suits.  A study by Albert McCormick that reviewed 
307 SYG cases, however, cautions on the dangers of using media reports 
and other secondary sources in empirical work.124  Here, the use does not 
seek to quantify certain factors related to SYG cases.  Rather, these 
accounts could be used descriptively to provide information on how 
 
 117. See generally PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW:  
STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE (1998). 
 118. See generally WHITE LOGIC, WHITE METHODS:  RACISM AND METHODOLOGY  
(Tukufu Zuberi & Eduardo Bonilla-Silva eds., 2008). 
 119. See generally KAARYN S. GUSTAFSON, CHEATING WELFARE:  PUBLIC ASSISTANCE 
AND THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY (2011) (using interviews with welfare recipients in 
California to capture their understanding of rule breaking). 
 120. See generally JEANINE BELL, HATE THY NEIGHBOR:  MOVE-IN VIOLENCE AND THE 
PERSISTENCE OF SEGREGATION IN AMERICAN HOUSING (2013) (augmenting her study of 
incidents of move-in violence with interviews of victims). 
 121. See generally CHARLES EPP ET AL., PULLED OVER:  HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE 
AND CITIZENSHIP (2014) (including interviews in an empirical study of police stops in 
Kansas City metropolitan area); see also Barnes & Chang, supra note 33, at 683–85 
(averring that the focus group interviews with state troopers may help to contextualize 
discriminatory views not otherwise noted within traffic stop data collected in Washington 
state). 
 122. See generally Ellen Berry et al., Situated Justice:  A Contextual Analysis of Fairness 
and Inequality in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 46 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 1 (2012).  
For 1788 employment discrimination cases between 1988 and 2003, the researchers 
interviewed over 100 of plaintiffs‘ and defendants‘ representatives, to assess whether the 
parties viewed discrimination law as fair. See id. at 3. 
 123. This appears to have been what was done in other recent studies. See BELL, supra 
note 120; EPP ET AL., supra note 121, at 172 (building sample of interviewed respondents in 
part from drivers who had reported being stopped by police in an initial survey). 
 124. See McCormick, supra note 73, at 2.  Other researchers have pointed out that, with 
narratives culled from media reports, it is difficult to discern whether the stories are 
―extreme and unusual.‖ EPP ET AL., supra note 121, at 21. 
2015]  SOCIAL AND RACIAL EFFECTS OF SELF-DEFENSE LAWS  3203 
individual complications of SYG laws are experienced in a manner that 
may otherwise evade discovery.  Unless and until researchers include 
interviews, surveys, focus groups with key SYG actors, etc., these media 
reports may be one of the few tools available for gathering richer details 
regarding which persons can and cannot stand their ground.  Such stories 
have the potential to have a powerful impact on law reform.  While few 
outside of South Florida have heard of the story of Sherdavia Jenkins, no 
one in America escaped the media frenzy around the Trayvon Martin case.  
That case has done much to educate the public about the complicated racial 
dynamics that can play out in SYG jurisdictions and has directly led to 
efforts to repeal the reform in Florida.  Amassing many more such 
compelling stories from a larger number of states likely will be necessary to 
press legislators to reconsider the legal efficacy of such laws. 
II.   THE WAY FORWARD:  UNDOING POLITICAL CAPTURE AND 
INTRODUCING THE SYG ―BOOMERANG‖ 
While I contend that understanding the data above and collecting more 
and different data is necessary to assess the merits of SYG laws, ultimately, 
any move away from current statutes will involve convincing policymakers 
of the laws‘ potential danger.  For this task, perhaps only the criminal 
deterrence data will matter.  Findings regarding racial disparities may prove 
less convincing to a society that has essentially declared itself to be post-
race, despite significant statistics suggesting race still matters in most 
important areas of American life.125  Additionally, recent polls have 
identified the widely disparate views held across different races about SYG 
laws.  In a poll conducted in the aftermath of the Trayvon Martin case, 
Blacks and Whites expressed differing views on the relevance of SYG laws 
to the case.126  For Blacks, 73 percent believe George Zimmerman would 
have been charged sooner had Trayvon Martin been white, while only 33 
percent of Whites hold this view.127  There are also differing views across 
race on whether George Zimmerman was guilty, and 52 percent of Whites 
believe race played no part in the case.128  Even with robust crime 
deterrence data, attitudes such as these demonstrate why it will be a difficult 
task to gain broad-based support for the repeal of SYG laws.  Below, I 
suggest two strategies—one political and one a thought experiment—that 
may contribute to the efforts to at least encourage states to revisit SYG 
laws. 
 
 125. See Barnes, Chemerinsky & Jones, supra note 62, at 982–92. 
 126. See Yamiche Alcindor, Poll Shows Racial Divide on Views of Trayvon Martin Case, 
USA TODAY (Apr. 6, 2012, 12:53 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/ 
2012-04-05/trayvon-martin-poll/54047512/1. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id.  Blacks, however, do not uniformly reject SYG laws.  See Weathersbee, supra 
note 9 (citing a Quinnipiac study that indicated 37 percent of Blacks favored SYG, while 57 
percent opposed it). 
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A.   SYG and Political Capture 
Although SYG laws have gained a strong foothold, consistent with 
former Attorney General Holder‘s comments that began this Article, many 
argue that the SYG reforms were attempts to find solutions where no real 
problems existed.  As there was no crime control justification used to back 
the law reforms, states modified their laws based principally on the strength 
of NRA and ALEC narratives about empowering victims who were 
insufficiently protected under standard self-defense statutes.  Because most 
states do not require racial impact data prior to adopting new criminal laws, 
little attention was paid to the potential for disparate racial consequences 
under the new laws.  Recently, there have been some efforts to investigate 
the efficacy of SYG laws.  In October 2013, for example, the U.S. Senate 
Judiciary Committee held hearings on the public safety implications of 
SYG laws.129  More recently, in May 2014, the U.S. Civil Rights 
Commission began a national study of whether SYG laws promote racial 
bias.130  It is not clear, however, that even national efforts such as this will 
cause adopting states to reconsider these laws.  Based on the success of this 
campaign to promulgate SYG laws and the NRA‘s earlier campaign to 
spread conceal and carry laws, one can only surmise that reforming SYG 
laws will require progressive organizations to expend similar political 
capital.  So, creating comprehensive data regarding the potential dangers of 
the statutes is only a first step in undoing SYG laws.  Each state will need to 
be sold on a message of repeal or amendment, which past experience 
suggests will have the best opportunity for success when the message is 
orchestrated by organizations that also can explain important data and 
convince state lawmakers why SYG is so problematic. 
The likely suspects for undoing the political capture that proliferated 
SYG would be organizations that advocate for civil rights and civil 
liberties.  This list likely would include groups such as the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) Legal 
Defense Fund, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, 
the National Urban League, American Civil Liberties Union, and many 
other more regional organizations that focus on racial justice.131  There are 
other organizations, however, with access to the data and resources to 
intervene.  For example, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur 
Foundation and Brennan Center for Social Justice recently held a 
roundtable at New York University.  The goal of the meeting was to 
identify strategies for reducing the jail population in the United States.  At 
 
 129. See Sullivan Testimony, supra note 13. 
 130. See John R. Lott Jr., Right to Stand Your Ground Transcends Race and Politics, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL (Oct. 19, 2014), http://www.orlandosentinel.com/opinion/os-ed-stand-
your-ground-hearings-101614-20141015-story.html. 
 131. While it would be impractical to include all the entities to which this description 
pertains, additional examples include the Equal Justice Society, Equal Justice Initiative, 
Southern Poverty Law Center, and the Lawyers‘ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law 
(which exists in a number of cities).  One might also imagine an advocacy role for 
professional organizations, such as the American Bar Association—which is already 
considering the SYG issue—and the American Medical Association. 
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that meeting, I challenged the group conveners to consider a role for their 
organizations as policy advocates for social science evidence proving the 
public safety crisis burgeoning around SYG laws.  Not until organizations 
of this kind turn their energies toward spreading information about reform 
will there be an opportunity to undo the political capture the NRA and 
ALEC perfected. 
B.   SYG and the Theory of the “Boomerang” 
While connections between SYG statutes and increased homicide rates 
are important, helping states to realize the full breadth of the potentially 
negative consequences of SYG laws will not be easy without more vivid 
examples.  The narratives I advocate for, including in future studies, could 
provide potentially salient examples.  Certainly, one would hope that being 
confronted with many stories like those involving Sherdavia Jenkins and 
Trayvon Martin would have some ability to shift public sentiments.  A more 
compelling opportunity for intervening exists around the important issue of 
SYG laws authorizing increased violence against people perceived as 
dangerous—also known as, according to previously assessed studies,132 
young black and brown men.  As I argued above, disproportionately 
negative consequences for black and brown men and others for whom 
stereotypes related to violence attach are unlikely to spur a majority of 
legislatures to rethink the merits of the statutes.  I, however, have been 
working through a thought experiment that may make the disparate 
consequences experienced by men of color more real for everyone.  My 
premise is that SYG laws are so unobjectionable because a great many 
citizens are not worried about being misperceived as threatening under the 
statutes.133  In SYG jurisdictions then, you are likely to be deemed justified 
in using force when you injure or kill certain people of color.  Again, this is 
why the ability to successfully invoke SYG, is tied to the race of the victim. 
My goal would be to dislodge this particular side effect of negative 
stereotypes, by making reliance on such stereotypes more punitive for 
everyone.  A perverse way to force everyone to deal with consequences of 
certain victims being perceived as more dangerous, would be to suggest that 
misperceptions of violence should be read to empower those perceived as 
more violent to use violence first.  In other words, a person‘s 
misperceptions about another person being violent are visited back upon 
 
 132. See supra notes 88, 92–96. 
 133. For similar reasons, I have previously argued that many Americans have not 
protested against the U.S. government‘s post-9/11 civil liberties encroachments; as people 
unlikely to be regarded as suspected terrorists, many do not see the laws as imposing 
consequences for them. See Mario L. Barnes & F. Greg Bowman, Entering Unprecedented 
Terrain:  Charting a Method to Reduce Madness in Post-9/11 Power and Rights Conflicts, 
62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 365, 391–94 (2008).  Poll results confirm this phenomenon.  For 
example, prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, 80 percent of 
Americans claimed that they opposed ethnic profiling. David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. 
L. REV. 953, 974 n.86 (2002) (citing Gallup poll).  After the terrorist attacks, 60 percent of 
Americans were in favor of ethnic profiling, ―as long as it was directed against Arabs and 
Muslims.‖ Id. at 974 n.88 (citing the New York Times). 
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them because the person wrongly thought to be violent could use the danger 
created by the stereotypical assignment as a justification to act even earlier.  
A poignant example of applying this approach can be demonstrated through 
Jody Armour‘s work.  In a 1994 Stanford Law Review article, Race Ipsa 
Loquitor, Professor Armour provided a scenario where a white woman shot 
a black man in line with her at an ATM machine because she perceived him 
(incorrectly) as dangerous, when he reached for his billfold.134  Under the 
approach I present here, understanding the woman‘s irrational fear based on 
stereotypes of black criminality, the black man at the ATM would be 
empowered to use violence first—perhaps, even before she brandished a 
pistol.  In a crude sense, his doing so would be tantamount to the 
anticipatory or preemptive self-defense approach the United States has 
recently observed in the national security context.135 
I call this approach of empowering certain putative victims to respond 
violently before they have become actual victims a ―boomerang‖ theory.  I 
do so because these scenarios represent instances where the consequences 
of someone‘s misperception about violence based on stereotypes is visited 
back upon them.  Clearly this approach is dangerous and inadvisable.136  It 
is the equivalent strategy of seeking to correct racially disparate results in 
the administration of the death penalty by advocating the killing of more 
 
 134. Jody Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitor:  Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, 
and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781, 781–82 (1994). 
 135. See generally Anthony C. Arend, International Law and the Preemptive Use of 
Force, 26 WASH. Q. 89 (2003) (defining and assessing the legality of the doctrine).  Some 
would argue that a justification similar to ―boomerang‖ has been tried and failed under SYG.  
For example, in Long Island, New York, John White was convicted of second-degree 
manslaughter for killing a seventeen-year-old boy, Daniel Cicciaro, who was with a group of 
boys who came to his house to challenge his son to a fight.  He considered the boys—who 
brandished no weapons but were shouting racial epithets and threats—to be a ―lynch mob‖ 
and claimed he was reminded of the racial violence his family experienced in the Deep 
South. See Corey Kilgannon, Sentence Commuted in Racially Charged Killing, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 23, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/24/nyregion/24commute.html?_r=0.  
While the court rejected White‘s self-defense claim, Governor Paterson commuted his 
sentence after he served five months in prison. Id.  A form of the preemptive self-defense 
claim already has been mostly rejected by courts in the context of severely abused women 
who claimed self-defense when they shot their sleeping husbands.  See, e.g., State v. 
Norman, 366 S.E.2d 586, 587 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572 (Kan. 
1988); see also Joshua Dressler, Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers: Some Reflections, 3 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 457, 457–58 (2006) (arguing that the cases where abused women kill 
sleeping husbands involve a form of ―nonconfrontational ‗self-defense‘ homicide,‖ which 
should not be deemed morally justifiable). 
 136. It is not to say that the approach is absolutely unimaginable because persons who 
unreasonably fear black and brown men often receive a benefit but no disadvantage from 
their misperceptions.  It is, however, probably unworkable as a standard, and certainly 
morally repugnant. See infra notes 137–41 and accompanying text.  In a way, the approach is 
reminiscent of Professor Richard Delgado‘s rotten social background defense which argued 
that we should excuse criminal behavior for those who have suffered from extreme 
socioeconomic deprivation. See Richard Delgado, “Rotten Social Background”:  Should the 
Criminal Law Recognize the Defense of Extreme Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAW & 
INEQ. 9 (1985); cf. Stephen J. Morse, Severe Environmental Deprivation (AKA RSB):  A 
Tragedy, Not a Defense, 3 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 147 (2011). 
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Whites.  This is, of course, incendiary, and ignores the better approach:  
calling for the state to kill less of all people. 
A boomerang theory, of course, immediately raises a number of legal and 
policy concerns.137  First, what groups would be considered subject to 
prevailing stereotypes about violence?  While there is significant data on 
views related to violence and criminality for Blacks, and to a lesser extent 
Latinos, there may be a lack of data for other groups whose members 
should qualify.  Second, the application of stereotypes means race broadly 
might not matter as much as the particular physical characteristics of certain 
people of color.  Both legal and social science research have tackled 
questions related to the legal significance of skin color138 and facial 
features.139  Based on this work, one could imagine an argument that fairer 
skinned or less ―ethnic-looking‖ people of color should be regarded as 
having weaker boomerang claims.  Third, because social identity is 
composed of multiple factors beyond one‘s race, one might need data on 
myriad attributes, which could demonstrate that while black and brown 
people are stereotyped as more violent, black women and Latinas are 
thought to be less so.  Would the gender data caution against these women 
asserting boomerang claims?140  There is also the accurate criticism that if 
anyone were ever to successfully argue a boomerang defense—e.g., ―I used 
early and ill-advised force upon someone because I discerned that based on 
my race and gender they were about to do the same to me‖—it would 
actually then transform SYG jurisdictions into the worst form of shoot-first 
localities.  Essentially random and typically nonviolent encounters could 
become a race to use violence first based on shared understandings of how 
misperceptions work.  For example, a person who shoots a black or Latino 
man because he or she wrongly perceived them as dangerous could also use 
an even more attenuated form of a boomerang claim by stating, ―I shot the 
victim because based on his race and gender, I knew that he thought that I 
likely thought he was dangerous.‖ 
 
 137. A boomerang approach might also be unnecessary if jurisdictions would create more 
sensitive mistake of fact rules for misapprehending threat/dangerousness under SYG laws.  
The issue, however, might be that jurisdictions would find mistakes premised upon race to 
be ―reasonable‖ due to the fact that many people are captured by stereotypes. On the concept 
of courts accepting as ―reasonable‖ biases found in society, see Joshua Dressler, When 
Heterosexual Men Kill Homosexual Men:  Reflections on Provocation Law, Sexual 
Advances, and the Reasonable Man Standard, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 726 (1995) 
(addressing the question within the context of gay panic defenses). 
 138. See, e.g., COLOR MATTERS:  SKIN TONE BIAS AND THE MYTH OF A POST-RACIAL 
AMERICA (Kimberly J. Norwood ed., 2014); TONRY, supra note 92, at 7; Taunya Lovell 
Banks, Colorism:  A Darker Shade of Pale, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1405 (2000) (arguing that skin 
tone discrimination disadvantages dark-skinned but not fair-skinned Blacks); Trina Jones, 
Shades of Brown:  The Law of Skin Color, 2000 DUKE L.J. 1487 (arguing that skin color, 
rather than the traditionally understood broad category of race, will increasingly provide a 
basis for discrimination). 
 139. See, e.g., Irene V. Blair et al., The Influence of Afrocentric Facial Features in 
Criminal Sentencing, 15 PSYCH. SCI. 674 (2004); Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy, 
supra note 90. 
 140. Essentially, the question for asserting the claim would be whether women of color 
would be viewed consistent with their presumed less violent genders or more violent races. 
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There is also the issue of confrontations that will suffer from multiple 
misperception errors.  In the employment context, Professor D. Wendy 
Greene has written about misperception discrimination involving workers 
who are mistreated at work because they are believed to be a minority when 
they are not.141  Misattribution of race within the SYG law context allows 
for the compounding effect of misperceptions—e.g., because I erroneously 
thought you were black, I viewed you as violent consistent with stereotypes 
pertaining to your perceived race.  Title VII currently provides no remedy 
for such claimants.142  There is a similar question as to whether a 
phenotypically racially ambiguous person would be able assert a 
boomerang type claim when they may only be perceived as belonging to a 
stereotypically violent group, to which they do not actually belong.  These 
types of extrapolation and compounded misperception errors are maddening 
and could go on endlessly.  The point, however, is not really to alter who is 
justified in shooting first, but to force everyone to understand the harm of 
being misperceived as dangerous.143  I know that dislodging the power of 
ubiquitous stereotypes and resulting implicit bias is nearly impossible.  The 
best one can do is cause a person to pause while assessing threat to ask the 
question whether they are associating race with dangerousness in a manner 
that may result in a false positive.  The power of the false positive is greatly 
increased when more people can imagine being included within the group. 
CONCLUSION 
The story around the SYG revolution is still unfolding.  Ultimately, 
current and future empirical studies of the effects of these statutes will 
explicate whether SYG law reforms disserve criminal deterrence goals 
and/or create more racially disparate results than other criminal defense 
standards.  These studies, however, also represent both an opportunity and a 
challenge for those of us advancing the potential synergies of a broader 
CRT and social sciences project.  The promise of such studies is that they 
may demonstrate the dangers of expanding state-sanctioned violence, and 
do so in a manner that is sufficiently attendant to the lived experiences or 
―stories‖ of the disadvantaged.  The challenge of over-investing in such 
studies is myriad.  First, despite what I have articulated here and hope to 
accomplish in the future, it is not clear that the social science community 
will find future studies more compelling simply because they include 
qualitative components.  Second, as the current studies evince, more 
research may not reconcile the disparate results for the two questions I have 
posed.  In fact, it may be that we have yet to sufficiently explicate the 
 
 141. D. Wendy Greene, Categorically Black, White or Wrong:  „Misperception 
Discrimination‟ and the State of Title VII Protection, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 87 (2013). 
 142. See id. at 89–91. 
 143. This thought experiment is essentially designed to create what CRT luminary, 
Professor Derrick Bell, described as an ―interest convergence‖ between white perpetrators 
and minority victims. See Derrick Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980) (describing how interest-convergence 
theory surmises that societal gains for Blacks are typically only embraced when they also 
include a benefit for Whites). 
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variety of distinctions that may matter within the SYG context.144  Finally, 
even if studies definitively prove the existence of a racialized effect of SYG 
laws, given that racialized effects within self-defense law predate the SYG 
reforms, finding such an effect may not be enough to spark repeal efforts.  
Any repeal effort, then, might only be possible if the data show a 
considerable, comparative disadvantage to such laws. 
Finally, there is the problem that such studies might produce counter-
normative results.  While a social scientist might easily accept as true 
findings that these criminal law reforms have little to no racialized effect, 
such a result would create deep skepticism among many critical scholars.  It 
is not that critical scholars reject science.  Such findings, however, would 
be inconsistent with the many studies that have found that race affects one‘s 
experience in the criminal justice system.  Also, part of what it means to be 
a critical thinker is to understand that all methods are fallible and that data 
do not interpret themselves.145  Moreover, given that many of us inhabit 
minority social identities, it is unlikely that we will decide that the 
subordination and structural forms of disadvantage we believe to be real are 
actually illusory.  The goal, of course, is to continue to assess social science 
research to locate places of helpful exchange.  Truthfully, however, the 
eCRT project likely will not be fully realized until critical and socio-legal 
scholars develop something else:  trust.  That trust will allow critical 
scholars to believe that race has been appropriately considered and 
measured within data sets.146  Equally as important, it may cause 
researchers to reconsider their research results and designs when critical 
scholars suggest they are wholly inconsistent with the lived experience of 
the legally and socially marginalized.  It is only with the development of 
this type of mutual respect—one that demonstrates a combined commitment 
to the robust investigation of the social forces that disproportionately shape 
the lives of those weighted by the burdens of stereotypes—that we will be 
able to fully realize the potential of the eCRT project and hopefully 
eliminate the need for discussions of false positives or ―boomerangs‖ (even 
as a thought experiment). 
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70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 945 (1996) (describing the ―culture of honor‖ that 
exists among white males in Southern versus Northern states and how it may help to explain 
greater rates of violent crime in the South).  I thank Professor Justin Levinson for drawing 
my attention to this research. 
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